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COMMENTS
OLD AGE ASSISTANCE IN WASHINGTON
Two decades ago, recognition of a governmental duty to care for
the aged who had no means of support had gone no further than to
provide for their maintenance in almshouses and poor farms. But
in 1922 the American Association for Labor Legislation and the
Fraternal Order of Eagles began a campaign to abolish the poorhouse
system and to substitute for it a proposed Old Age Pension Act providing for monthly grants to needy aged persons from funds to be
raised by county governments. Washington adopted this act in 19331
and by the end of the following year 28 states had enacted a similar
type of old age assistance law. Two years later, Congress passed the
Social Security Act, introducing another innovation. This Act contemplated a uniform system of old age assistance on a, nation-wide
scale, to be accomplished through state cooperation induced by a
system of federal grants-in-aid. By September, 1938, a plan to comply
with the requirements of the federal scheme was in effect in every
state in the Union, in the District of Columbia, and in Alaska and
Hawaii.2
The federal Act, as originally passed, provided that, within a maximum of $15 per month, the federal government would pay one half
of all grants to each individual over 65 years of age and not an inmate
of a public institution, made under state old age assistance plans
approved by the national Social Security Board, and would also pay
to each state 5% of the amount of the matching fund for administration costs.8 The Board was required to approve any plan which provided: (1) that it was to be in effect in all political subdivisions of the
state; (2) for financial participation by the state; (3) for administration or supervision of administration by a single state agency;
(4) for a fair hearing before the agency on any denied claim; (5)
for such methods of administration (other than those relating to personnel) as the Board should find necessary for efficiency; (6) that the
state agency should comply with requirements of the Board regarding
reports from the former to the latter; (7) that if the state collected
anything from the estate of a deceased recipient it would remit one
half to the United States; and which did not exclude, eo nomine, (8)
persons over 65 years of age (70-year requirement permitted until
January 1, 1940); (9) persons who had resided in the state 5 of the
past 9 years; (10) United States citizens. 4
In 1939 the Act was amended to provide matching funds, within a
$20 maximum, for monthly payments to "each needy individual" over
I WASHr

LAWS 1933, c. 29.
'Third Annual Report of the Social Security Board (1938), p. 7.

STAT. 621 (1935).
'49 STAT. 620 (1935). Note that it is a state plan, not necessarily a statute,
which must contain these provisions.
349
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65 years of age and not an inmate of a public institution.5 Changes
were also made in some of the requirements for state plans. Provision
(7), above, was omitted; 6 provision (5) was changed to allow for
establishment by the Board of a merit system of state personnel administration; and, beginning July 1, 1941, the state plan was also
required to provide: (11) that the state agency should consider any
other income and resources of an applicant "in determining need";
and (12) that the use of information secured by the agency would
be restricted to purposes of administration of the plan.7
To these requirements, as construed by the Social Security Board,
the states must comply in defining eligibility requirements and in providing the machinery of administration. Failure to comply, either
in the content of the plan or in its administration, will result in suspension of the federal matching funds. 8 No limitation is imposed upon
the amount of assistance which the state may give except the very
practical one that no matching funds will be forthcoming on so much
of the grant as exceeds the maximum specified in the federal Act.
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

Several months before the enactment of the federal statute, the
Washington legislature passed a bill abolishing the county old-age
pension system, "accepting" the provisions of the pending Social Security bill, and setting forth a rather liberal policy for providing old
age assistance. 9 Section Two of this statute provided that, subject to
other provisions therein, every person "in need" "shall be entitled to
old age assistance." Section Three directed payment of assistance to
every United States citizen 65 years of age (or such lower age as the
federal act might provide) who had resided in the state for 5 of the
last 10 years, was not an inmate of a public or private institution or
in need of continued institutional care, had not disposed of property
to qualify for assistance, and whose income was "inadequate to provide a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health."
No person receiving old age assistance was entitled to any other relief
from the state other than medical care,' ° but mere eligibility for old
age assistance would not preclude the right to other relief.1
Two years later the statute was amended. The previous definition of
income was replaced by a specific maximum of less than $360 per
year and the ineligibility of aliens and of persons in private institu553 STAT.

1361 (1939), 42 U.S.C.A. §303.

6 But the method of computing the amount which should be paid to the state

was changed to allow for a deduction of "a sum equivalent to the pro rata share
to which the United States is equitably entitled, as determined by the Board,"
of the net amount recovered by the state "with respect to old-age assistance furnished under the State plan," except that the state can credit against amounts recovered from the estates of deceased recipients any sums expended for funeral
expenses. 53 STAT. 1361 (1939), 42 U.S. C.A. § 303.
7 53 STAT. 1360 (1939), 42 U.S.C.A. § 302.
849 STAT. 622 (1935), 42 U.S.C.A. §304.
WASH LAWS 1935, c. 182.
"Od., § 9; REM. REv. STAT. (Supp.

1939) § 9998-9. Smith v. Spokane County
187 Wash. 197, 60 P. (2d) 77 (1936) (blind pension). And see WAsH. LAWS 1937,
c. 132, § 14; REm. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 10007-12.
" WASH. LAWS 1935, c. 182, § 22; RaM. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9998-22.
Smith v. Spokane County, 183 Wash. 477, 48 P. (2d) 918 (1935) (blind pension).
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ions was removed.' 2 Another act of the same session repealed the
statute -requiring certain relatives to support the disabled poor.' 84
Under the statute as amended, our Court decided in Conant v. State'
that the particular requirements set out in Section Three constituted a
definition of "need" as that term was used in Section Two, and that
any person satisfying these requirements was entitled to.assistance
as a matter of right. Hence, willingness and financial ability of children to support the applicant, not being mentioned in Section Three,
did not affect his right to assistance from the state.
The 1939 legislature evidenced a more conservative conception of
economic need. It added to the existing statute a "declaration of intent" that old age assistance was not to be available as a matter of
right, but was to be available only to persons who were in need.', A
"person in need" was defined as one who does not have resources
sufficient to provide himself and dependents with food, clothing, shelter
and "such other items as are necessary to sustenance and health."
"Resources" was defined to exclude home, household goods and personal effects of applicant, foodstuffs produced by applicant for himself and family, and cash surrender values less than $300 and loan
values less than $100 under insurance policies more than 5 years old.
It was defined to include the ability of a spouse or child of legal age
residing in the state to contribute to support, except that if such spouse
or child should refuse to contribute, it could be determined that such
ability to assist did not constitute a "resource sufficient to render the
applicant ineligible to assistance."' 18
With the assistance of a provision in the 1935 act that all assistance
was granted and held subject to any amendment or repealing act, the
Court held that the 1939 amendment would operate to support a reduction made
in 1938, based on ability of children to contribute to
7
support.'
But the stricter requirements imposed by the legislature were
greatly liberalized at the general election of November 5, 1940, when
the people passed Initiative 141,18 providing for assistance to each
65-year-old person (or those of such lower age as Congress might
thereafter provide) who has resided in the state for 5 of the last 10
years, is not an inmate of a public institution, has not disposed of
property to qualify, is "without resources" and whose income is less
than $40 per month (or, if federal contributions in exceess of $20 per
month became available, whose income is less than twice the maximum
federal contribution). Section Three (g) defines income to exclude:
(1) value of use or occupancy of residence; (2) foodstuffs, livestock,,
fuel, light or water produced by or donated to applicant for use of
applicant or his family; (3) casual gifts of cash not exce6ding $100
per year; (4) casual gifts in kind of the same value; (5) proceeds
' WAsH. LAWS 1937, c. 156, § 1; Rxa. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9998-3.
"Id., c. 180, § 22, repealing REm. REV. STAT. §§ 9981-9984, 9987-9991.
"197 Wash. 21, 84 P. (2d) 378 (1938).
"WASH.

LAWS 1939, c. 25, § 1; REm. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939)

§ 9998-1a.

"WASH LAWS 1939, C. 25, § 3; REm. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9998-7a, and
WAsH LAWS 1939, c. 216, § 17; Ram. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 10007-117a.
'17 Adams v. Ernst, I Wn. (2d) 254, 95 P. (2d) 799 (1939).
" WASH. LAWS 1941, c. 1, § 1..

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16

from the sale of property which is not a resource. In subdivision (h)
of Section Three "resources" are defined to exclude: (1) ability of
friends or relatives to contribute to support; (2) insurance policies
of less than $500 cash surrender value; (3) homestead, home or place
of residence of applicant or his spouse; (4) intangible or personal
property of less than $200 value; (5) personal effects of applicant,
including clothing, furniture, household equipment and motor vehicle;
(6) foodstuffs, livestock, fuel, light or water produced by applicant,
his spouse or family for use of applicant or his family.
The new law was submitted to the Social Security Board for approval and the Board found that subdivisions (g) and (h) of Section
Three were inconsistent with the requirement in the federal Act that
the state plan provide that the state agency should consider "other
income and resources" of an applicant "in determining need," and
that these subdivisions "may also be in violation of" the 1939 amendment, providing for federal matching funds for payments to "needy"
individuals. 5 Thereafter, the state Attorney-General gave his opinion
that, in view of the provision in Section Two of the initiative measure
that the intent of the measure was to provide for assistance "as liberally as is possible under the terms of the Federal Social Security
Act," the obvious intent of the people was "to go only so far as they
could in providing grants and still remain within the requirements of
the Federal Social Security Act." Hence, in view of the decision of
the Social Security Board, he advised that the definitions of "income"
and "resources" in the inconsistent sections be disregarded and that
the terms be given their ordinary meaning, taking into consideration
"all income and resources without substantial exception." 20 A revised
21
plan, conforming to this recommendation, was approved by the Board
and was put into effect March 1, 1941.22
Support for the Attorney-General's interpretation of the intent of
the people is also found in the fact that the severability clause of the
1941 act anticipates not only that a part of the act may be found
unconstitutional, but also that it may be "declared" "invalid or not
in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Social Security
Act." 22 But, if that be the intent of the people, the execution of that
intent at least suggests a constitutional question.
It seems clear that a state legislature may, subject to its particular
constitutional provisions regarding legislative incorporation by reference, incorporate in its enactments the existing statutes and administrative regulations of another state or of the federal government,4
without raising any question of the delegation of legislative power .2
And it appears to be established that the legislature may also enact a
20

Minutes of Meeting of Social Security Board, Washington, D. C., Novem-

ber 15, 1940.
20

Opinion No. 4428, Ops. Att'y Gen. (1940).

21 Document No. 6164, Order of Social Security Board, January 28, 1941.
22 Staff Memorandum No. 104, State Department of Social Security, January
30, 1941.

21

WASH LAWS

1941, c. 1, § 21.

"Ex parte Burke, 190 Cal. 326, 212 Pac. 193 (1923); Chicago Motor Club v.
Kinney, 329 111. 120, 160 N. E. 163 (1928); Fagg, IncorporatingFederal Law Into
State Legislation (1930), 1 J. Am L. 199; Note (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rav. 674.
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statute conditioned to take effect or to become inoperative upon the
promulgation of a described type of statute or administrative ruling
in another jurisdiction.25 But where the statute contemplates the
filling in of content by future enactments of a foreign body, most
courts have found that there was a delegation of legislative power in
violation of state constitutional provisions.2" While the decisions purport to be searching for a "primary standard," as in any other delegation case, some of them also reveal that the courts consider any sort
of delegation to extra-state
agencies an unwarranted relinquishment
7
of state sovereignty.
It would seem that the same considerations would apply to an
initiative measure, so that the construction given to Initiative 141
involves a question of delegation of power. Superficially, of course,
the effect of the measure as construed is merely to incorporate the provisions of the federal Act. But, since it is the Social Security Board
which is to determine the question of inconsistency between the two
acts, and since any provisions in the state act which it cannot reconcile
with federal requirements are not to be enforced, the ultimate effect is
to clothe the Board with power to repeal irreconcilable portions of the
state law. It is the only body that can finally "declare" the provisions
not in accordance with federal -requirements.
On the other hand, it is apparent that the local enacting body has.
not surrendered any more of its policy-forming power than was surrendered by Congress when it passed the federal statute. .Obviously,
the intent of the initiative measure was to conform with the policy
which the Social Security Act is designed to effectuate. And the expression of policy in the requirements for local'plans set forth in the
federal law would seem to constitute standards sufficiently definite to
protect the federal act against attack as an unconstitutional delegation. The same standards should sustain the state act. Certainly, the
expediency of this sort of a device for insuring compliance with federal matching fund statutes should not be disregarded because of an
uncritical adherence to the notion of conflicting "sovereign" interests.
25

Gillum v. Johnson, 7 Cal. (2d) 744, 62 P. (2d) 1037 (1936); City of Pitts-

burg v. Robb, 143 Kan. 1, 53 P. (2d) 203 (1936); Howes Bros. Co. v. Mass.
Unemployment Comp. Comm., 296 Mass. 275, 5 N.E. (2d) 720 (1936) cert. den.,
300 U. S. 657 .(1937); State v. Andrews Bros., 144 Minn. 337, 175 N. W. 685
(1919). Cf. Johnson v. State, 187 Wash. 605, 60 P. (2d) 681 (1936), holding that
an act providing that it was to become operative from the date of enactment of
a described bill before Congress never became a law, when the bill finally passed
by 2Congress differed materially from the one described.
" Scottish Union Etc. Co. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 28 Ariz. 22, 235 Pac.
137 (1925); In re Opinion of the -ustices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N. E. 453 (1921);
State v. Intoxicating Liquor, 121 Me. 438, i17 At. 588 (1922); State v.
Webber, 125 Me. 319, 133 Atl. 738 (1926); Smithberger v. Banning, 129
Neb. 651, 262 N. W. 492 (1935); Darweger v. Staats, 243 App. Div. 380,,278
N. Y. S. 87 (1935), 20 CoR. L. Q. 504. Contra: E parte Laswell, 1 Cal. App.
(2d) 183, 36 P. (2d) 678 (1934), 10 WASH L. Rlv. 56; Commonwealth v. Alderman, 275 Pa. 483, 119 At. 551 (1923); Johnson v. Elliott, 168 S. W. 968 (Tex.

Civ. App. 1914). Warm, The Constitutionality of Laws Providing for Incorporation of Other Laws, Rudes and Regulations in Futuro. (1934), 8 U. Cnr. L. Rrv.
310.
'See In re Opinion of the Justices, 239 Mass. 603, 133 N. E. 453 (1921);
State v. Intoxicating Liquor, 121 Me. 438, 117 At. 538 (1922); State v. Webber,
125 Me. 319, 133 At. 738 (1926).
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AMOUNT AND NATURE OF ASSISTANCE

Under the 1935 Washington act, the amount and nature of assistance given was to be determined "with due regard to the conditions
existing in each case; but .

.

. shall not exceed" $30 per month unless

federal participation was increased, in which event the maximum was
to be twice the amount of the federal contribution. It was expressly
provided that this assistance might include, among other things, medical and surgical and hospital care and nursing.2" The state agency
was also authorized to pay reasonable funeral expenses not exceeding
death of a recipient if his estate was insufficient to pay
$100 on the
29
the same.

Any recipient who later acquired other property or income, or
whose spouse acquired other property or income, was required to notify
the state agency thereof and the agency was to make a corresponding
reduction or cancellation of assistance, and any excess assistance theretofore paid was made recoverable as a debt due the state 2 0 All grants
could be reconsidered from time to time and changes or cancellations
could be made where the circumstances so warranted.2 1
The act also contained a provision, the operation of which was conditioned on its being essential to obtain participation by the federal
government, giving the state a lien upon the estate of the recipient
for assistance paid, and authorizing the state agency to require a
recipient to pledge all or part of his property to secure reimbursement
for grants paid.3 2 The following section authorized the administrative
agency, when it had reason to believe that the spouse of a recipient
was able to assist the recipient, to bring suit against such spouse to
recover the amount he or she was able to contribute.3 3 The federal Act,
when passed, contained no such requirements, and the next
session of
4
the legislature expressly repealed both of these sections.1
The only other changes made by the 1937 legislature were alterations emphasizing a liberal trend in policy. The provision for a $30
maximum was amended to provide that the assistance granted "together with the applicant's own resources and income shall not be
less than" $30 per month and the section providing that funeral expenses not exceeding $100 "may be paid" was re-worded to provide
that they "shall be paid."23 An attempt by the legislature to remove
the provision for recovery of excess assistance paid before the administrative agency was apprised of an improvement in the recipient's
circumstances was vetoed by the governor.3 6
In 1939, legislative reaction to the Conant case led to restrictive
amendments, not only in the definitions of "income" and "resources"
previously discussed, but also in the fixing of the maximum grant at
an amount which, together with other income and resources, was "not
2' WAsH
2
Id., §
30Id., §
1 Id., §
3

LAws 1935, c. 182, § 4.
11.
13; REM. Rzv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9998-13.
15; REm. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9998-15.

2 Id., § 18.

3 Id., § 19.
WASH. LAWS 1937, c. 156, § 13.
'Id.,
§ 2; REm. Rzv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9998-11.

34
6

' Id., p. 533.
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to exceed $30 per month. '37 And a general public assistance act of that
year provided that upon death of a recipient the state could file a
claim for all assistance granted, which should be a preferred claim
against the estate, postponed in its enforcement against real estate for
so long as the premises were occupied by the spouse or minor children
of the decedent.38
Initiative 141 raises the amount of assistance to "not less than $40
per month ... minus the income of the applicant from other sources"
(or twice the amount of federal contributions, in the event that they
are increased) .89 Upon the death of a recipient, "funeral expenses in
the sum of $100 shall be paid by the department." 4 In addition to
the assistance in cash, the state is to provide "medical, dental, surgical, optical, hospital and nursing care by a doctor of recipient's own
choosing; and shall also provide artificial limbs, eyes, hearing aids
and other needed appliances." 41 Assistance given under the provisions of the initiative measure is not to be recoverable as a debt due
'the state, except where received contrary to the provisions of the measure, or by fraud or deceit, and all claims accrued or which may accrue
under the provisions of Chapters 25
42 [26] and 216 of the laws of 1939
are renounced and declared void.
ADMINISTRATION

The Washington act of 1935 made the administration of old age
assistance the duty of the Department of Public Welfare, and the De43
partment was authorized to make all necessary rules and regulations.
Applications were to be investigated by the department and the applicant was to be given written notice of its decision, which decision
was to be final. 44 This statute, supplemented by Department rules
providing for a hearing for any applicant whose claim was deiied,4 5
was approved by the Social Security Board, January 24, 1936.46
At the next legislative session a general public assistance act was
passed, vesting the administration of "all public assistance programs
originating under the jurisdiction of the Federal government" in the
Department of Social Security. 47 Each board of county commissioners
was designated as the agent of the Department and directed to employ
an administrator to act as chief executive officer of public assistance
in the county.4 It was also provided that any applicant dissatisfied
with the decision on his application could appear before the county
board and, if still dissatisfied, might appeal to the director of the
Department. From the decision of the director, he could, within 30
17WAsH LAWS 1939, C. 25, § 2; REm. Rav. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9998-4.
"Id, c. 216, § 24; REM. Rlv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 10007-124a.

3' WASH LAWS 1941, c. 1, § 5.

'oId, § 14.
"Id., § 15.
'2 Id., § 12.

'a

WASH. LAWS 1935, c. 182, §§ 4, 6.

"Id., §§ 7, 8.
"Letter from T. B. Asmundson, Examiner, State Department of Social Security, May 1, 1941.
" Second Annual Report of the Social Security Board (1937), p. 108.
s WAsH. LAWS 1937, c. 180, § 6.

"sId., § 7.
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days, appeal to the superior court. 49
Another act passed at the same session amended the existing old age
assistance law to provide for application to the Department of Social
Security, the decision of the Department to be "subject to a fair hearing" conducted by the director in the county of the applicant's residence, with a right to appeal to the superior court within 30 days
after the director's decision.50
The inconsistencies in these two statutes led to litigation, and the
general act, requiring initial application to be made to the county
administrator and varying the appellate procedure specified in the
old age assistance law, was held to control because it contained an
emergency clause and was approved by the governor two days after
he had signed the old age assistance bill.5 1
An act of 1939 repealed the procedural provisions of the general
statute of 193752 and provided that "upon receiving an application for
any category of Federal-Aid assistance . . . the County Administrator" shall render his decision within 45 days unless a longer period
is required to establish the applicant's age.5 3 Additional sections providing for appeal were vetoed by the governor, 54 apparently leaving
the provisions of the 1937 old age assistance act to govern appellate
procedure. At the same session the old age assistance law was supplemented with a provision that "upon receiving an application for old
age assistance, the officer authorized by law to consider and pass upon
the same shall" render his decision within 45 days. 5 Since the general
act was last approved, and contained an emergency clause, it apparently would control insofar as it conflicted with this provision. In any
event, the repeal of the 1937 statute did not necessitate any change
in the procedure established thereunder. 6
The 1941 measure provides for applications to the Department "or
an authorized agency" of the Department.5 7 The application must be
approved or denied within 30 days and the applicant notified in writing of the decision. Failure to notify within that time constitutes a
denial of the application. 8 Any applicant feeling aggrieved has a right
to a fair hearing before a representative of the Department in the
county of his residence, upon filing notice of appeal with the director
within 60 days after receiving notice of the decision. The Department
must provide a hearing within 30 days thereafter and must give
applicant 5 days notice of the date of the hearing, either by registered
mail or by personal service. The applicant is entitled to notice of the
decision on the hearing within 30 days, and failure so to notify him
'9 Id., § 12.
50Id., c. 156, §§ 3, 6; REm. Rxv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §§ 9998-5, 9998-8.
51 State ex rel Shoemaker v. Superior Court, 193 Wash. 465, 76 P. (2d) 306
(1938): McAvoy v. Ernst, 196 Wash. 416, 83 P. (2d) 245 (1938).
52 WASH LAWS 1939, c. 216, § 35; RzE.
REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 10007-135a.
" Id., § 17; Rasm. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 10007-117a.

,Id., p. 884.
Id., c. 25, § 3; Rz . REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9998-7a.
"Letter from T. B. Asmundson, Examiner, State Department of Social Security, May 1, 1941.
"'

58
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Id., § 7.

1941, c. 1, § 6.
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13,+

constitutes an affirmation of the original decision. 59
The applicant also has a right, within 60 days, to appeal from the
decision on the hearing to the superior court, and it is provided in
Section Nine of the act that both the applicant and the director "shall
have the right to present any additional evidence which the court shall
deem competent, relevant or material" and that the court should
decide the case on the record, and on "any evidence introduced before
it" and could "affirm, modify or reverse the decision of the director
and fix the amount of assistance to which the applicant shall be entitled under this act."
A general act passed by the 1941 legislature disregards the system
set out in the initiative measure and provides for local administration
of public assistance by a "county welfare department"'0 to be established by the county commissioners, with a right in any applicant
aggrieved by the county department's decision to appeal to the Department of Social Security, where he is entitled to reasonable notice and a
fair hearing. From the decision of the department he may "appeal to
the Superior Courts by proceedings in certiorari." 6' 1 While this act
would not seem to conflict with the general provisions in Initiative 141
for original applications, it clearly conflicts with the appellate procedure outlined therein. Since the initiative measure cannot be amended
by the 1941 legislature, 2 the procedural plan of the general act will
have to be construed either as not applying to old age assistance administration, or as providing an alternative method of appeal. 63
Another innovation of Initiative 141 is the section providing that
if an applicant is unable to establish proof of age or length of residence in the state by any other method, a statement under oath before
any judge of the Superior or Supreme Court of the state "shall constitute sufficient proof." 64
In examining the initiative measure, the Social Security Board decided also that the provisions of Section Nine "insofar as they provide
that the court may receive additional evidence . . . as a basis for decisions . . . or that the court may . . 'fix the amount of assistance',"

were inconsistent with the requirement of the Social Security Act that
the state plan provide for the administration or supervision of administration by a single state agency."5 Acting on the advice of the Attorney-General,6 6 the Department then revised the plan to provide for
court review to determine only whether the department had acted
within its power, employed an honest judgment, and acted neither
arbitrarily nor capriciously, with no power in the court to hear new
evidence on the merits or to fix the amount of assistance. This revi1Id., § 8.
60ld., c. 128, § 2, discussed at pp. 79-80, suprq.
" Id, § 4, discussed at pp. 80-81, .spra.
WASH. CONsT. AENm. VII.
discussion at pp. 80-81, supra.
WAsH. LAWS 1941, c. 1, § 11.

68
See
64

"inutes
of Meeting of Social Security Board, Washington, D. C., November 15, 1940.
"' Opinion No. 4428, Ops. Att'y Gen. (1940).
"' Document No. 6164, Order of Social Security Board, January 28, 1941.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16

sion met with the board's approval,6 7 and is now in effect.6 8
Obviously, this second alteration of the content of Initiative 141
raises again the constitutional question previously discussed. It also is
indicated in the Attorney-General's opinion that the provision in the
initiative measure is itself of doubtful constitutionality, since it may
involve a delegation of administrative power to the courts.6 9 But, in
view of Washington cases under the previous acts reviewing orders of
the Department and directing not only the payment of assistance, but
also the amount to be paid, 0 and of the consistent enforcement of the
provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act that the court, on
appeal, shall hear the case "de novo," on the record, to determine
whether the administrative agency has "correctly

. . . found the

facts,"' 7 1 the probability of our Court's holding the initiative measure
unconstitutional on this point seems rather remote.

Many questions remain to be answered under Initiative 141. The
measure includes the entirely superfluous provision, "All acts or parts
of acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.17 2 This adds nothing
to what would have been the effect of the act without such a provision-the status of prior legislation on the subject remains for judicial
determination. And what about former statutes in conflict with the
unenforced sections of the initiative measure? Under the 1939 legislation, ability and willingness of certain relatives to contribute to
support constitutes a resource; under Section Three (h) of Initiative
141, it does not. Apparently the 1939 statute is repealed, although
the conflicting section of the 1941 act is not actually in effect.
Some of these difficulties can be surmounted by the use of the Department's power to make rules and regulations. Although this power,
as granted in the initiative measure, is limited to the making of rules
and regulations "not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, '7' a
regulation of the Department now embodies the substance of the 1939
legislation on the effect to be given to ability and willingness of relatives to contribute to support.7 4 Apparently, the objectionable sections
are not even to be given the effect of limiting the Department's rule
making power.
8 Staff Memorandum No. 104, State Department of Social Security, January
30, 1941.

" "Under constitutional provisions similar to ours, statutes of other states
so construed have been held unconstitutional. Borreson v. Dept. of Public Welfare
(Ill.) 14 N. E. (2d) 485; Brown v. State Department of Old Age Assistance
(Ill.) 17 N. E. (2d) 221; In re Opinion of the Justices (N. H.) 154 At]. 217."
Opinion No. 4428, Ops. Att'y Gen. (1940).
"0State ex rel. Schmidt v. Sullivan, 190 Wash. 600, 69 P. (2d) 828 (1937)
(mandamus); Conant v. State, 197 Wash. 21, 84 P. (2d) 378 (1938) (appeal).
"Rm. Rv. STAT. § 7697. Cole v. Dept. of Labor & Ind., 137 Wash. 538, 243
Pac. 7 (1926); Johnston v. Dept. of Labor & Ind., 163 Wash. 549, 2 P. (2d) 67
(1931); Strmich v. Dept. of Labor & Ind., 186 Wash. 649, 59 P. (2d) 372 (1936).
"2 WASHr. LAWS 1941, c. 1, § 22.
3 Id., § 10.

7"Staff Memorandum No. 143, State Department of Social Security, March
14, 1941.
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COMMENTS

Other ambiguities may be removed by future legislation-at least
the unenforced provisions may be specifically repealed. But, in view
of the modifications that have been made in the content of the new
act, and of the uncertainties it has created, it would seem that its
adherents would have gained more had they simply worded the
initiative: "Old age assistance grants, together with other income and
resources of the recipient, shall be not less than $40 per month."
VERN CoUNTRYMAN.

SURVIVORSHIP IN JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS, and
WILSON v. IVERS
Joint bank accounts have given rise to considerable litigation, concerning a number of questions. A deposits money in a bank, payable in
any part to himself or to B, or to the survivor. If A draws upon the
account, may B assert an interest in the money taken, or in property
purchased with it? If B withdraws money, can A reclaim it?2 If A
dies must the bank pay B because the account is "payable to the
survivor," though B has no claim of ownership?5 If B is permitted
to keep what remains at A's death, is the account subject to estate
and inheritance taxes? 4 Do A's creditors have redress against B? These
are some of the problems presented to the courts. A more common
question, and the subject of this Comment, is whether B becomes
the owner of the account at A's death. Has survivorship been obtained? 5
None of the cases consulted has held that under no conditions
could B become the owner of the joint account at A's death. They
This subject is treated by Havighurst, Gifts of Bank Deposits (1936)
14 N. C. L. Rsv. 129; Hemingway, Joint Tenancy in Bank Accounts (1931)
10 CHI.-KENT L. 1Ev. 37. Katzenstein, Joint Savings Bank Accounts in
Maryland (1939) 3 Mi. L. REv. 109, and Slater, Joint Accounts and Trusts
Created by Bank Deposits (1932) 2 BROOKLYN L. REv. 27, discuss the trust
theory as it applies to two-party bank accounts. Generally, see Comment
(1937) 32 ILL. L. REV. 57; In re Edwards' Est., 140 Ore. 615, 14 P. (2d) 274
(1932). Also, PATON'S DIGEST (1926) §§ 1809 et seq.; BRADY, BANKNG LAW
JouRNAL DIGEST (4th ed. 1933) §§ 401 et seq.
2The inter vivos relations arising from joint bank accounts are briefly
discussed in Note (1938) 13 WASH L. REv. 230.
3
RPmv REv. STAT. § 3249, authorizing the bank to pay the survivor, is
similar to the draft recommended by the American Bankers Association "to
clear up any legal doubt concerning the authority of the bank to pay
over an account to the survivor." 2 PATON'S DIGEST (1926) § 1809 (a).
Today 31 states have adopted statutes similar to this, and only Alabama,
Kentucky and Tennessee have no statutes on the subject, per information
supplied by the A. B. A.
'Re the Washington law on this subject, see note 39 infra.
That the account is payable to the survivor (the normal provision of
a joint account agreement) does not mean he may keep what he withdraws (a right termed survivorship). In re Edwards' Estate, 140 Ore.
615, 14 P. (2d) 274, 277 (1932); Smith v. Planters' Say. Bank, 124 S. C.
100, 117 S. E. 312 (1923) (dissenting opinion).

